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Settlement Agreements, Legal Information and the Mistake of 
Law Rule in Contract 
 
David Collins∗ 
 
ABSTRACT: 
The extent of the doctrine of contractual mistake of law is evaluated in light of the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Brennan v Bolt Burdon through the lens of economic 
efficiency, the associated incentivization of productive information acquisition and 
contractual risk allocation. The Brennan court’s decision limits the relief available for 
claims of mistake grounded in unanticipated changes in the law to mistakes involving 
exceptional errors.  In so doing it acknowledges the risk inherent in accepting 
contractual settlement offers as a matter of commercial risk taking which can be offset 
through express contractual limitation, subject to public policy concerns. The article 
considers the effects of such contractual risk allocation as well as the cost of 
dispelling ignorance to recommend a clarification of the scope of the mistake of law.  
This rule is based upon the gains to be achieved from the underlying contract to the 
contractual parties as well advantages to society engendered by the dissemination of 
information about the law itself. 
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1. Introduction 
In entering a contract for the settlement of a civil claim based upon the perception that 
the suit may fail due to the status of a particular precedent or statutory provision, both 
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the claimant and the defendant undertake the risk that the law may not be as they 
understand it to be and consequently their decision to abandon a claim or defence may 
be unwise. A wide ambit for the doctrine of mistake of law could vitiate this concern, 
allowing parties to renege on such agreements when based upon flawed assumptions 
about the ongoing validity of the law. In so doing, the precise application of this 
doctrine will have significant effects upon the behaviour of settling parties, most 
notably those attempting to reach a pre-trial compromise in litigation. This behaviour 
may have effects beyond the particular transaction because of the important role legal 
information plays in society. 
 This article will consider the scope of the mistake of law rule in contract from 
an economic perspective.  It will analyse the ways in which a narrow interpretation of 
this rule, as seen in the Court of Appeal decision in Brennan v Bolt Burdon1, may 
affect both the acquisition of productive information and foster contractual risk 
allocation, ultimately contributing to the enhancement of social welfare. The 
discussion will offer a more clearly delineated test for the mistake of law rule in 
contract that explicitly takes into account the costs of resolving uncertainty and more 
complete contract drafting compared to the gains of underlying transaction, which 
include the avoidance of trial in the case of settlements as well as the dissemination of 
useful information regarding the law. This article will not examine restitutionary 
mistake, such as that involved with the payment of money based upon mistake.2 
Rather it will draw upon economic concepts to focus on the entrance into litigation 
settlement agreements grounded in a mistaken understanding of the law, as seen most 
clearly in the context of litigation settlements as in Brennan. Before we consider the 
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scope of the rule in light of this decision it is necessary to review the economic 
rationale which underlies the doctrine of mistake in contract law. 
 
 
2. Mistake and the Social Welfare of Productive Information 
In assessing the efficiency of legal rules regarding mistake in contract, scholars have 
drawn a distinction between mistakes which are based upon a lack of information that 
could have been obtained through effort (productive information) and those based 
upon mistakes resulting from a lack of information that could have been casually or 
fortuitously acquired (non-productive or re-distributive information).3  The former 
type of information is productive in that it can be used to generate greater wealth for 
society by allowing existing uses of goods or property to be shifted to more 
productive ones, such as farmland being used for oil drilling. In contrast, ordinary 
factual information is often merely re-distributive in that it can only be used to 
allocate wealth in favour of the informed party - it does not add to the knowledge base 
of society and as such does not improve social welfare. The logic of this distinction 
was noted by Kronman as the reason for the lack of a general duty to disclose relevant 
facts in the law of contract, allowing parties to profit from their superior knowledge.4  
The concept of productive information is not without its critics, for example 
Trebilcock has argued that the generation of allegedly productive information may 
lead to a waste of resources because it may already be held by others and may also be 
transmitted at low cost.5  In the case of legal information this may equate to 
researching a legal issue, the answer to which is already widely known. 
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Still, in conventional economic theory as first postulated by Rasmusen and 
Ayers, it follows that relief should be granted for mistake if the gains from trade for 
mistaken parties are negative or where the care to avoid mistake was merely re-
distributive rather than productive.6  Mistake should be found where it was based on 
useless information, because it would have been a waste of resources to obtain it.  In 
the context of a settlement agreement in litigation, a negative gain will occur where 
the quantum of the settlement predicated upon a mistaken understanding of the law 
falls short of the amount that would have been awarded at trial, taking into 
consideration the foregone cost of that trial. This represents a failure to compensate 
properly claimants for the injuries they have sustained.  In other words, mistake is 
paying too much or receiving too little because of a misunderstanding of one’s legal 
rights 
However the distinction between productive and redistributive information is 
largely inapplicable in the case of mistake of law because of the inherent worth in all 
information about the law. Acquisition of legal knowledge can be seen as the most 
valuable type of information because it has the potential to affect the rights of a wide 
segment of society, unlike information about a particular traded asset, even one that 
may generate vast quantities of wealth such as an oilfield as in the example noted 
above. Likewise, legal research is the most productive labour undertaken by lawyers 
because the effort does not need to be repeated for every client, unlike for example 
work involved in familiarizing oneself with a particular set of facts, such as a client’s 
assets or liabilities.  Of course legal knowledge must be adapted somewhat to fit each 
client’s particular fact scenario and this can be quite time consuming. Since the law 
should encourage activities that enhance social welfare, a transaction founded upon a 
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mistake induced through one party’s failure to seek information about the law could 
be viewed as efficient in that it will incentivize greater investigation into the law for 
the benefit of all.  Denying mistake in such circumstances will promote future 
aggregate social gains in terms of knowledge of precedent acquired for subsequent 
use, even though one party might lose out in the transaction at hand.7  In a sense, 
though, such information is merely distributive rather than productive – the 
information was not unknown generally, just unknown to certain individuals. The 
social utility must be viewed in light of the, admittedly discredited, Declaratory 
Theory of Law, which posits that the law has always existed and as such legal 
information can never really be ‘created’ in the sense that ordinary information can.  
Legal information can still be uncovered and clarified through research and re-
litigation.   
 Economic theory also suggests that for the sake of efficiency the law should 
assign liability for mistaken assumptions of law or fact to the party who can insure 
against the contingency at least cost.8  This is because contracting parties should 
allocate the risk of mistake occurring to the party that can obtain information most 
easily and in so doing minimize the joint costs of contracting.9  It is necessary to 
determine which party was better placed to obtain the information the lack of which 
led to the mistake. Information that might be available by chance to one party may 
require effort of another party to be obtained due to their relative endowments or 
position. Since they have possession, sellers of goods are generally seen as better able 
to acquire knowledge about the traded good and therefore their informational costs 
will be lower than those of the purchaser. Trebilcock’s contention that inequality is 
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balanced by the purchaser’s superior knowledge with respect to the planned use for 
the good10 is untenable as we should expect that planned uses are either obvious or 
else disclosed to ensure suitability for purpose. The law should therefore uphold 
mistakes on the part of purchasers regarding some feature of the good in question.11    
Such logic should not strictly apply to settlement agreements which can be 
voided for mistake of law. While both the seller (the claimant) and the purchaser 
(defendant) hold private factual information regarding the strength of their respective 
cases, regardless of the law’s attempt to correct this mutual uncertainty through 
disclosure rules, the law in question is common to both sides and publicly available. 
Relative endowments are more relevant to mistake of law in as much as wealth will 
augment the accessibility of legal information through the greater affordability of 
comprehensive legal research. This must be viewed in light of the fact that defendants 
(such as manufacturers) will have a greater incentive to investigate the law relating to 
a particular issue than will a single claimant victim because similar lawsuits will 
likely arise again. For some parties the burden of obtaining the necessary information 
to eradicate a mistake of law might exceed the efficiency gain from the transaction 
itself.  The commercial unacceptability of this cost imbalance can be presumed via the 
doctrine of revealed preferences:  a party prefers to incur the risk of transacting in 
absence of knowledge rather than incur the high cost of obtaining information. As 
such they are said to be rationally ignorant.12   
The decision not to contract around risk of mistake of law, or to avoid it 
through research may again simply demonstrate the parties’ endowments - a wealthier 
party is better placed to engage in speculative litigation based on an un-investigated 
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legal principle.13  This could be equally indicative of the attitudes towards or 
understanding of risk on the part of the trading parties. As Kahneman’s concept of 
cognitive bias indicates,14 a decision such as whether to settle a claim or negotiate to 
avoid the risk that it will be avoided may be the result of ‘bounded rationality.’ For 
example a solicitor or her client’s may suffer from an irrational incapacity to 
appreciate that an apparently established precedent could have been overruled because 
this has not been directly observed by them before, whereas the burden of personally 
experienced past litigation costs (or failures at trial or appeal) as alternatives to 
settlement are much more real and memorable.15 Such inexperience is as much a 
feature of professional skill as is proficiency in legal research, but importantly it 
should be reflected in the price of the legal services such that it can be properly 
assessed as a transaction cost. 
 The extent to which courts has evaluated these risk of uncertainty in the rules 
for mistake of law will now be considered in light of the most recent English case on 
mistake of law in contract, Brennan v Bolt Burdon. 
 
 
3. Brennan and Mistake of Law 
The Court of Appeal decision in Brennan v Bolt Burdon examines the extent to which 
a claim of common mistake of law (both parties make the same mistake) can operate 
to void a contract, a principle that had been previously established in Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council16 in relation to restitutionary claims for the 
                                               
13
 This ignores the fact that wealthy parties have more to lose in litigation than poor ones. 
14
 D Kahneman, P Slovic, A Tversky 
15
 This phenomenon is known as the Availability Heuristic. 
16
 [1998] 4 All ER 513. BP v Aon Ltd [2006] EWHC 424 (Comm) suggests that there remains a 
substantial doubt as to whether Kleinwort applies to a contract entered into under a mistake of law 
(although this case did not refer to Brennan).  
 8 
payment of money by mistake. In Brennan the claimant was a tenant who had 
suffered personal injuries due to the inhalation of carbon monoxide which had 
resulted from the faulty operation of a boiler in the defendant Islington Council’s 
premises during two periods of time in the 1990s. The claimant had instigated an 
action against the defendant but due to an oversight by her solicitors, the claim form 
was not served within four months of the date of issue, in violation of the Civil 
Procedure Rules (‘CPR’) Part 7 Rule 5(2). Consequently the defendants filed a 
motion under CPR Part 11 Rule 1 to have the claim set aside as out of time. The 
application was duly granted by the recorder who relied on two Court of Appeal 
judgments relating to the extension of time for service.17  But before the initial claim 
was set aside the claimant had already launched a second action against Islington 
relating to the second period of time during which the boiler had caused her injuries. 
After the recorder’s decision to set aside the first action on the grounds of breach of 
the CPR’s timeframe, the defendant’s solicitor requested that the claimant’s solicitor 
discontinue the second action, arguing that it was inevitable that it would also be set 
aside for delay given that the claim form in the second action had also been served 
past the relevant deadline. The claimant’s solicitor agreed in writing to discontinue 
the action provided that the defendant would not make an order for costs such that 
each side would be responsible for its own costs only. In essence the settlement 
contract was predicated upon the shared assumption that the law as it stood dictated 
that the claims would be stricken for delay. 
However, unknown to both parties, one of the authorities18 on which the 
recorder had relied in her dismissal of the original action as out of time had actually 
been reversed by the Court of Appeal before the settlement agreement had been 
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concluded, the result being that the service of both claims had actually been valid. 
Brennan appealed the recorder’s decision, arguing that that the compromise 
agreement was void for a common mistake as to law. The defendants asserted that 
their settlement agreement was binding and applied to the court to stay this appeal of 
the first action until Miss Brennan performed her agreement to discontinue the second 
action on the basis that each party would bear its own costs. This application was 
refused and the appeal of the first action eventually came before the Court of Appeal.  
 According to Maurice Kay LJ the central matter at issue was whether the 
compromise of proceedings entered into by the parties on the basis of common 
mistake of law was void by reason of that mistake. Acknowledging Kleinwort, the 
court re-iterated that a common mistake of law may now render a contract void. 
Furthermore, under Huddersfield Building Company Ltd v Henry Lister & Son 
Limited19, a compromise in litigation is a contract to which the ordinary rules of 
contract law apply and indeed it can be set aside due to mistake. Relying on The 
Great Peace20, which established that for a common mistake to be operative it must 
render performance of the contract impossible to perform, Maurice Kay ruled that the 
court’s acceptance of the service past the due date was not truly impossible, as there 
was a chance that the court might have interpreted the relevant case law in a more 
lenient fashion:  there would be a small but statistically significant chance of 
persuading the court to take a different view regarding delay of service. This 
probability of success fell considerably short of the unequivocal result flowing from 
mistake outlined in Kleinwort as well as Great Peace’s need for impossibility. The 
fact that Brennan’s solicitor did not even inquire as to whether the relevant authority 
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regarding extension of time for service was under appeal or not was taken by Maurice 
Kay to indicate that there was a general lack of prudence on the part of the promisor 
and that the court should be ‘reluctant to countenance as a mistake of law a situation 
in which it is generally known or ought to be known that the law in question is about 
to be reconsidered on appeal.’21 Thus Brennan was seen to have born the risk that the 
assumption was untrue.   This encapsulates the obvious difference between the case in 
which a lawyer overlooks a decision of the Court of Appeal and one in which the 
lawyer reads the cases accurately but fails to anticipate that the decision on which she 
relies will be overturned.  
 It is Maurice Kay’s and Bodey LJ’s comments regarding this assumption of 
risk in contractual relations that is most telling with respect to the economic rationale 
underpinning the court’s decision. Drawing upon the dicta in Great Peace which 
referred explicitly to the need to identify which party has undertaken the risk that a 
contract will become impossible to perform, Maurice Kay stated:  
 
where a party wishes to reserve his rights in the event of subsequent judicial decision 
in a future case to which he is not a party, it is he who should seek and secure a term 
to that effect, not his opponent who should have to stipulate for protection 
notwithstanding the possibility of such a subsequent decision. Such a requirement is 
consistent with the policy of encouraging settlements and respecting their finality.22 
 
 
He concluded by classifying the situation underlying the compromise agreement as a 
state of doubt rather than as a true mistake of law.23  The risk of a future judicial 
decision which could be advantageous to his client was impliedly accepted and 
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bargained away by the claimant’s solicitor. Bodey stated that it is the nature of 
contractual transactions, such as compromise agreements in litigation, that ‘both 
parties recognize the risk that their opinions as to the point of law in question may not 
be right’ and that later judgments may be issued which ‘render erroneous a former 
interpretation of the law which had seemed to be sound.’24  Quoting from Kleinwort, 
Bodey emphasized that a person who performs a contractual obligation when in doubt 
that they are required to do so (by either law or fact) assumes the risk that he may be 
wrong as an inescapable vagary of the common law tradition. As Peel justly notes,25 
Bodey’s comments hint at the absurdity of the Declaratory Theory of Law. Bodey 
goes on to state that there is no operative mistake if one party can be said to have 
borne the risk that the parties might be mistaken in some way. 
 Although the claimant’s solicitor’s decision to engage in the second suit at all 
was based upon imperfect information (it was unknown at the time that the recorder 
would dismiss the first claim as out of time) Maurice Kay cautions that the reliability 
of the information on which this decision was based could have been augmented by 
further inquiry into the status of the precedents at issue. Specifically the solicitor 
could have learned whether the judgment upon which the recorder relied was 
currently before a higher authority and therefore more susceptible to reversal. 
However as we shall see this investigation would represent a further transaction cost 
which could either impair the settlement process or negate the benefit of avoiding 
greater litigation costs as Brennan had hoped to achieve. 
 
 
4. Contractual Risk Allocation and Pricing of Legal Claims 
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Bodey’s final remarks in Brennan illuminate the crucial role that the law plays in 
ascribing default terms to contracts and the implications in terms of allocative 
efficiency. According to him, if parties wish to accommodate the possibility that the 
law will change subsequent to the commencement of contractual relations then it is up 
to parties themselves to provide for this in the contract itself.26 The opposite 
conclusion - that an express provision is needed specifically to permit the contract as 
written to stand in the event of a change in the law is quite rightly seen as absurd. 
These statements implicitly acknowledge the Coase Theorem: the efficient outcome 
will be achieved irrespective of the law through negotiation between the parties.  
However the truth of Bodey’s assertion, and indeed of the Coase Theorem, depends 
on an assessment of the expense of including a clause such as this one in settlement 
agreements, as indeed in any other contract, a classic transaction cost. It is by no 
means clear that the ex ante legal costs of negotiating such a term into a compromise 
agreement would outweigh the gains of avoided disputes. Efficient contracting would 
be more likely were solicitors to use standard form compromise agreements that are 
exhaustive in their coverage because the marginal cost of so doing would decrease the 
more situations in which such contracts were implemented. In these situations the 
removal of a standard clause expressly negating the effect of any future changes in the 
law could further be used as a bargaining chip in the attainment of a more favourable 
settlement agreement or indeed a lower priced good.27 Clearly the allocation of risk of 
mistake of law through express contractual provision will occur when contracting 
parties see this as the cheapest way of avoiding the risk, the only alternative risk 
limiting option being the acquisition of information about the true status of the law to 
the point of near certainty, as we will see below. 
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 The extent to which mistake of law or fact will be countenanced by a court in 
the absence of contractual stipulation may depend on the subjective perception of risk 
on the part of the party making the claim, which as we have noted above may be 
irrationally founded.  Burrows holds that a party making a claim for mistake should 
only be denied recovery where at the time of contracting the party thinks that the facts 
are probably as they are in truth but contracts anyway, essentially meaning that he had 
taken a substantial risk that what he thought was the actually truth would not be 
divulged.28  Virgo takes a harsher view, suggesting that there should be no relief 
where the claimant was even aware that there was a possibility that he was mistaken.29  
This latter approach appears to echo Bodey’s view that any suspicions regarding the 
veracity of law or fact should be reflected in the text of the contract itself. It is perhaps 
however inapplicable in the context of mistake of law because of the nature of the 
system of precedent which by its nature obviates absolute certainty in the law at a 
given time, despite the Declaratory Theory of Law’s fiction of permanence in the law, 
if not in its interpretation.   
 Bodey notes a further practical difficulty that would result if the conclusion 
that mistakes relating to the understanding of law would permit the avoidance of 
contractual obligations were to stand. Inevitable uncertainty would be injected into all 
contracts because of the natural fluctuations in the law resulting from appeals to 
successive levels of court. This observation is tied to the understanding of legal claims 
as commodities which can be traded, an analogy reflected to an extent in the contract 
principle that forbearance from suit is good consideration.30 Any indeterminacy in the 
valuation of these ‘goods’ because of their potential to be rendered baseless through a 
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honestly believed that it was valid). 
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change to the law represents what is aptly termed market failure. Legal claims will not 
be traded, and there will be no settlements, because it will be nearly impossible for 
sellers or buyers to ascribe any value to them. Of course claims are not actually 
bought in an open market because in a settlement negotiation there is only one buyer 
(the defendant) and one seller (the claimant).  Legal claims are thus highly price-
elastic – whether or not a settlement is reached is highly contingent upon the quantum 
requested.31 There is consequently no price-setting competition except possibly that 
reflected in a single defendant’s decision to allocate its limited resources to settle a 
particular claim amongst a series of claims from several claimants, a situation that is 
not unrealistic given the exposure of large corporations to numerous consumers. With 
deficient price signals for claims resulting from legal uncertainty, the only way to set 
a price would be to do so contingently, perhaps by multiplying the sterling sum of the 
claim by the probability that it is based upon a law that will not be overruled. Given 
the expected high propensity for error in such calculations it can be suggested that if 
the law wishes to facilitate settlements as a means of reducing the strain on the civil 
justice system,32 then the market for claims must not be any more volatile or 
speculative than it is already. This leads to the unsurprising conclusion that the ambit 
of mistake of law must be attenuated, as the Brennan court appeared to do. 
 Uncertainty engendered by the freedom of a party to escape a compromise 
agreement arguing mistake of law adds another layer of complexity to the strategy 
involved in negotiating both the terms of a contract (i.e. risk allocation regarding 
potential mistakes) and the decision whether to extend or accept an offer to settle. 
Such processes have been evaluated under Game Theory, where the decisions of 
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others, such as litigants or co-contractors, are taken into account when developing a 
strategy for one’s own decisions, which will ultimately be reflected in the price of the 
traded commodity.33  For example, in a contract for the sale of land, the strategy for 
setting the price will require the seller to consider whether or not they should incur the 
cost of investigating the full extent of their legal encumbrances on that land,34 or 
whether it is safe to sell in ignorance of such restrictions in anticipation that the 
purchaser will also not investigate. This recognizes each party’s desire to minimize 
their own informational costs in the absence of a contractual provision regarding 
mistake, for example as the hiring of surveyors or lawyers, which are typically 
associated with confirming the full value of the assets in one’s possession. A seller 
could risk setting a price without investigating the actual worth of the property in the 
hope that it is accurate or if it is excessive that the purchaser will purchase in 
ignorance. The purchaser could in turn submit a lower bid, but the seller must then 
risk that this lower offer is a bluff and not a more accurate assessment of the land’s 
true value based upon research.35  Similarly in choosing whether or not to settle, 
litigants will have to speculate as to whether their opponents have investigated into 
the validity of a relevant legal principle, which may involve a further assessment of 
the resources which the opposing side have available to dedicate to litigation, as well 
as whether there may be a cost-capping order or other judicial interference. The ex 
ante cost- benefit analysis of decisions to settle becomes that much more uncertain 
and therefore costly as well as error-prone. Some contracting parties would view such 
tactical manoeuvring as a normal feature of the market and one which encourages the 
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 Rasmusen & Ayers at 339 (in relation to mistake rules specifically).  See also Cooter & Ulen at 392-
396 and Ogus at 23-24. 
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 For example the land may be subject to restrictive covenants or easements which may be unknown to 
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 Subject to the limitation that sellers have the obligation to clarify any known misunderstanding on 
the part of purchasers or else a contract may be set aside for mistake, so-called unilateral mistake: 
Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
 16 
obtaining of socially productive information to improve one’s chances of arriving at 
an efficient contractual result. Acknowledging mistake of law in a broader range of 
circumstances would appear to negate this type of behaviour, minimizing 
informational costs while increasing the uncertainty that ostensible contractual 
commitments will be upheld without some kind of express provision in the agreement 
negating mistake.  Stop here.  What is my bottom line here.   
 
 
5. Mistake of Law and Contract Externalities 
McKendrick and others suggest that the policy upon which the mistake doctrine is 
based is that there has been a failure of consent.36 Accordingly it might be argued that 
there should be no resulting inefficiency by permitting a wide ambit for mistake of 
law because, with the true status of law revealed, parties are free to manifest their 
genuine consent through contract at some later stage. Moreover a transaction resulting 
in a net loss because of a flawed misunderstanding, such as an insufficient quantum in 
a settlement agreement, is negated.37  Acknowledging that mistake of law will 
abrogate consent can also be seen as inefficient because through the voiding of 
contract the parties are returned to their pre-contractual position with the transaction 
costs of bringing arguing mistake representing a loss.38 There is no resulting 
efficiency in an aggregate sense either39 since, again, the traded good remains in the 
hands of the party who held it to begin with.  This is still the second best solution to a 
fully informed contract because at least a negative-gain transaction is avoided. 
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 Despite these outcomes for the parties themselves, contracting may result in 
effects felt by others or by society, so-called ‘externalities.’ In the context of mistake 
of law, the primary effect is the generation of legal knowledge.  As noted above, by 
allowing relief through mistake of law to void settlement agreements there will be no 
welfare improvement to society from the dissemination of an unknown feature of the 
law that could have formed part of the dispute at trial. This is because with mistake of 
law readily available, contracting parties will not have an incentive to engage in legal 
research which can be used to consolidate their positions in the event of disputes. This 
lost information could have been reported for use by later litigants as precedent or be 
used to inform legal advice, lowering the risk of future costly claims by driving the 
law towards clarity.40  The truth of this assertion is predicated on the characterization 
of information about the law as socially useful per se, unlike information about all 
other traded goods, for example whether a painting is a genuine Constable or whether 
a certain car is an antique. Although ordinary factual information of this nature may in 
some circumstances benefit parties beyond the transaction at hand, such as all future 
purchasers or even art enthusiasts, in a welfare-enhancing sense this does not compare 
to the benefit of legal information that is potentially of use to all members of society 
through the clarification of legal rights and obligations. Legal precedents may 
similarly be viewed as public goods the availability of which improves compliance 
with the law and thereby reduce the burden on the state, for example by reducing the 
need for police, as well as the reliance upon lawyers. 
A wide ambit for mistake of law is problematic also because it could lead to 
moral hazard; the taking of unnecessary risks in the knowledge that they can be 
shifted to others. With mistake of law readily available future contracting parties will 
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be less likely to inform themselves about prospective changes in the law that may 
have inconspicuously occurred before the conclusion of a contract because they know 
that if such a change is later revealed they will be able to back-track on their 
obligations. Thus we will expect that more claims of mistake of law will be made in 
relation to compromise agreements, which again represents an efficiency loss to the 
civil justice system by frustrating settlement in favour of costly trials.  Still it should 
be acknowledged that unlike settlements, trials lead to the development and reporting 
of legal precedent and as such they represent a public good.   
The acknowledged concern for third parties with respect to mistake in contract 
law is the injustice that may be brought upon good faith purchasers who discover that 
a commodity was obtained under a subsequently void contract such that they lose 
their legal entitlement to goods for which they have paid. This problem should not 
apply with respect to mistake of law for contracts of compromise as in Brennan 
because as claims as commodities cannot be sold to third parties by defendants. Still, 
others such as shareholders of the public corporations involved in litigation may act in 
reliance upon the settlement of a claim only to discover that the settlement agreement 
has later been voided for mistake of law, perhaps selling or purchasing their holdings 
under the misapprehension that further costly litigation had been avoided.41The effect 
of litigation events therefore becomes a flawed signal for corporate performance, 
eroding investor’s ability to gauge the value of shares, which should be viewed as an 
efficiency loss to society.42 The often-cited disadvantage suffered by third party good 
faith purchasers should persist for contracts voided for mistake of law other than 
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settlement agreements, such as those involving the exchange of real or moveable 
property for which legal restrictions are unknown.  
With relief for mistake limited to exceptional circumstances as indicated in 
Brennan the legal profession may extract rents from clients by increased fees through 
prolonged litigation instead of settlement. Lawyers will however suffer from 
increased exposure to professional negligence claims for failing to detect changes in 
the law which cannot be excused. This will represent a loss to their clients in the form 
of higher fees to offset the risk. This burden could be exacerbated by the fact that a 
client may honestly assert after the failure of his mistake of law claim that he would 
have paid for the extra research required to avoid the mistake if he had been properly 
informed that it might be needed, where in reality he would still have preferred a 
quick settlement to avoid the higher fee.43  More expensive legal fees will naturally 
cause the price of entering into contractual relations to rise. This represents a barrier 
to commerce generally and is thus against the interests of social welfare. In the case of 
commercial contracts between affluent parties we should not expect the effect of this 
increase in legal fees to be commercially prohibitive and the result might even be 
advantageous in that the risk of missing the narrow exception for mistake of law will 
encourage neglectful lawyers to practice their trade with greater caution, as long as 
excessive caution is not taken, which would be a waste of resources.44  Greater care 
might further improve the signalling expertise within an already competitive 
profession – the lawyers who are most fastidious are be able to demonstrate this 
through higher fees, improving choice for consumers.   
Principal-agent problems between solicitors and their clients could be 
exacerbated because without a broad mistake of law rule solicitors could legitimize 
                                               
43
 This phenomenon is known as Hindsight Bias.  
44
 Smith and Smith at 468. 
 20 
greater billings for the purpose of legal research by reference to the unforgiving 
uncertainty of the law. This is especially so if they are paid by the hour and not on a 
conditional fee basis where the incentive to over-bill is most seductive.45  Research 
into the status of the law beyond that which is actually required to meet the clients 
needs may represent a further cost to society because it contributes to the rise in the 
price of legal services, potentially undermining access to justice without a 
corresponding increase in the value of those services. In this way mistake of law 
should be seen as advantageous because it discourages wasteful over-searching for 
informational advantage.46 This latter point challenges the assumption that all legal 
information is necessarily beneficial, which as Trebilcock has noted may not be the 
case if the information is already widely known and can be transmitted at low cost.47 
 The Brennan court appears to envision that mistake of law will only be 
permitted in circumstances where society at large may benefit. Sedley notes the 
important role of public policy in determining when precisely the rule will apply.48 
Maurice Kay similarly urges that exceptions to the rule that mistake of law is 
available in contract should be rooted in public policy.49  Accordingly we should be 
mindful that Brennan’s legally aided claimant’s solicitor commented that his decision 
to abandon the second dubious claim against Islington in exchange for the defendant’s 
willingness to forgo its right to costs against the claimant was based upon his duty to 
the Legal Services Commission to minimize unnecessary costs.50  The degree to 
which litigation has received public financial support may inform the issue of public 
policy, in particular in relation to the value of the legal information which would have 
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resolved the mistake. If the additional billed work that was necessary to clarify an 
ambiguity in the law represented a significant resource drain on public funds that was 
disproportionate to the benefit anticipated, courts may wish to countenance the 
omission of such services by permitting the voiding of a contract entered into on the 
basis of inadequate knowledge. This is because the Legal Services Commission will 
have already made its own assessment with respect to the potential public interest 
involved in a claim, often choosing to fund cases that may develop a novel point of 
law or raise an issue that affects the rights of society at large.51 This cost-benefit 
analysis should not be supplanted by a judicial determination in order to extend the 
use of public money for the purposes of generating information about the law. On the 
other hand a clear public interest element should justify greater expenditures on 
research. 
 The obligation of greater research into the law necessitates a consideration of 
the role of the law reporters as instruments of achieving the socially desirable goal of 
‘equality of arms’ in legal representation by permitting courts to lower the cost of 
controlling the risk of mistake. The imperfect availability of information regarding the 
law exacerbates resource asymmetry between contracting parties because some 
parties can afford to acquire this knowledge while other cannot, especially given the 
considerable expense of the more comprehensive private legal research databases like 
Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis. With mistake of law operating only in exceptional 
circumstances such that few mistakes of law will be forgiven it may be necessary for 
the Parliament to consider improving the availability of legal information through the 
expansion of coverage of free on-line databases of case law such as Her Majesty’s 
Court Services, the subsidization of non-profit organizations like the British and Irish 
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Legal Information Institute,52 or the provision of private legal databases in public 
libraries. With legal information more readily available we should expect that 
mistakes of law will be less common. 
 The inference of causation between the lack of information-seeking activities 
and the resulting mistake may be fallacious because some of the legal information 
upon which contractual rights hinge is inherently unknowable irrespective of 
resources. This is due to the nature of the legal profession as well as the uncertainty of 
the common law system. While counsel often rely on unreported decisions, it is not 
always possible to access all decisions in order to dispel mistaken assumptions about 
the law, especially given the volume of decisions and the time delay before some 
form of transcript is available.53  Further, it is important to recognize that in Brennan, 
as Wu rightly observes, the understanding of the law upon which the consent order 
was based could be proved by reference to non-privileged sources: the recorder 
striking out the claim against several co-defendants in the same action; the recorder 
basing her decision on another judgment that was later overturned; and the fact that 
the settlement was premised on the recorder’s judgment.54 Were this information 
subject to strict professional privilege, a claim of mistake of law could not be 
substantiated, resulting in significant inequalities in terms of access to evidence 
between a claimant and defendant, as is often the case in a restitutionary claim for 
mistake of law.55  Of course such privately held information might not properly be 
termed ‘legal’ information in the sense of it contributing to knowledge of the law 
itself as a precedent or statute would, further indication of the often blurred distinction 
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between mistakes of law and those of fact.56 Balancing the mistake of law rule with 
professional privilege requires weighing the costs to society resulting from revealing 
otherwise unknowable information through the suspension of professional privilege 
against the transaction cost-reduction of providing contracting parties with more 
complete information. Legal professional privilege should not be restricted unduly 
because of the important role confidences between solicitors and their clients plays in 
the encouragement of settlement of civil claims by encouraging clients to consult 
legal experts without fear as well as permitting litigants to conceal weaknesses in their 
respective cases.57   
 
 
6. Defining the Optimal Scope of the Mistake of Law Rule 
The ambiguity of the Brennan judgment with respect to the delineation of the full 
extent of mistake of law has been observed by some commentators58 and can be 
equated with the flexibility of a standard rather than the certainty of a rule.59 While a 
standard allows some room for judicial discretion relating to issues such as public 
policy – which may reflect the fact that parties that have acted in good faith, it runs 
the risk of stirring future costly litigation because of the failure to articulate a more 
comprehensible and predictable outcome for all cases.  Trebilcock in particular has 
warned that changing mistake rules to accommodate different circumstances is 
‘hopelessly indeterminate operationally and likely to significantly exacerbate 
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uncertainty, error and adjudication costs in contracting generally.’60 Thus, in light of 
some of the economic considerations canvassed above, a somewhat more focused rule 
will now be suggested.  This is a modification of the rule first suggested by Rasmusen 
and Ayers that accommodates which countenances greater transaction costs in the 
dispelling of ignorance of the law because of the inherent value in all forms of legal 
knowledge, as distinct from certain types of factual information. 
 Relief based on mistake of law in contract should be tailored to the cost of the 
cheaper of either obtaining the necessary information or allocating the risk of mistake, 
relative to the loss engendered by the overall mistaken transaction, which in the case 
of compromise agreements will be the difference between the quantum of settlement 
and what would have likely been awarded at trial, taking into consideration what the 
trial itself would have cost. The latter two variables will typically have a high degree 
of uncertainty but should not be beyond meaningful contemplation in what is meant to 
be an exercise of general balancing rather than mathematical computation. Limiting 
the availability of mistake to errors resulting from information that would have been 
excessively costly to correct under this analysis (through either information or 
acquisition or risk allocation) is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most efficient means of 
circumscribing the applicability of mistake of law in contractual relations. If the cost 
of offsetting the risk of mistake of law through contract were to affect the price of the 
traded good such that a transaction would not be completed (for example the 
settlement of a claim became prohibitively expensive because of the additional layer 
of stipulated risk that the settlement could be withdrawn given the discovery of a 
mistake) then a court should not expect a contracting party to include such a provision 
in a contract and mistake of law should accordingly operate in default. As an 
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alternative to unreasonable pricing for risk avoidance through contract, the court 
should consider the cost of dispelling ignorance of the law. If the informational cost 
of obtaining the necessary information about a pertinent legal principle, for example 
by paying a solicitor to engage in more comprehensive legal research, is so high that it 
would place an undue burden upon the party in question, assessed by reference to the 
profit expected from the transaction to that party (i.e. the quantum of a settlement), 
then the ensuing mistake should be forgiven. This is because the obtaining of the 
information itself would be inefficient, i.e. the contract would result in a waste of 
resources because the process of contracting would exceed the wealth increase to the 
party and would therefore represent a sub-optimal outcome.61  Evidence relating to 
legal search fees and billings would be needed to make this determination, as would 
the size of the settlement, and the likelihood of victory at trial all of which are capable 
of at least rudimentary consideration by courts.  
When assessing the cost of negating mistake through additional research 
courts must further consider the inherent social value in the transmission of legal 
knowledge which is achieved by bringing claims to a trial which is ultimately 
reported, notwithstanding the fact that this knowledge may have represented an 
excessive transaction cost to the parties at hand and may have undermined a cheaper 
settlement conducted in ignorance. In keeping with the principle of Great Peace that 
only the most egregious of errors will be sufficient for a finding of common mistake, 
only those mistake-induced settlements agreements which are severely 
disproportional to that which would likely have been awarded at trial should be 
eligible to be voided, and then only if the cost avoiding mistake is also high relative to 
the public interest in disseminating knowledge of the law. This should ensure that the 
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law is diligently but reasonably investigated by solicitors and settlement agreements 
are not prohibitively uncertain. Such methodology broadly echoes conclusions 
observed by Farnsworth who pointed out that a rule of strict liability for mistakes of 
law is inferior to one based a negligence standard because the value of learning the 
law is higher when the law excuses reasonable mistakes, since a person who takes 
such steps is protected against punishment even if one is mistaken in what one 
learns.62   
  
 
7. Conclusions 
A contracting party wishing to avoid liability for a mistake of law has three options: 
include a contractual provision which expressly allows relief from contractual 
obligations due to mistakes of law (which may either prevent the contract from being 
commercially feasible or negate the purpose of settlement); obtain the necessary legal 
information to achieve a reasonable degree of certainty about the status of the law in 
question; or do nothing and sue one’s solicitor in negligence for failing to do either of 
the first two options (which would likely only be an available course of action were 
advice on these matters not provided from the outset). 
When keeping these alternative courses of action in mind, courts should not 
expect contracting parties to suffer disproportionately high transaction costs because 
of the complexity of the legal system or the expense of obtaining information on the 
status of the law. Unlike the simple test from Great Peace which established that the 
common mistake of fact will depend upon the severity of the error by reference to the 
contractual undertaking, mistake of law should be contingent upon the magnitude of 
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the investigation or contractual risk avoidance that would have been required to avoid 
the misunderstanding in relation to the contract’s resulting value, much as Rasmusen 
and Ayers originally theorized.  Unlike for mistakes of fact, this rule is subject to the 
crucial modification that even some inefficient contracts do generate social welfare 
because of the intrinsic value of legal information to a society.  This rule is in keeping 
with economic reasoning in that it upholds contracts that are social welfare 
maximizing and excuses those which are not.  
 While the developments in the law are perhaps now more complicated than 
ever given the interplay of precedent in a myriad of courts and legislative instruments 
in the United Kingdom and the European Union it also has become increasingly easy 
(although perhaps no less expensive) to stay informed of these changes through 
advances in information technology relating to the law. At the same time the need to 
uphold settlement agreements as a means of avoiding costly litigation remains a 
primary objective of the civil justice system. The Brennan court’s decision to limit the 
availability of the mistake of law defence only to what might be viewed as the most 
economically justifiable errors is consequently welcome. 
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